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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of legal unbundling vs ownership unbundling on the
incentives of a network operator to invest and maintain its assets. We consider an
industry where the upstream rm rst chooses the size of a network, while several
downstream rms then compete in selling goods and services that use this network
as a necessary input. We contrast the (socially) optimal allocation with several
equilibrium situations, depending on whether the upstream rm owns zero, one or
two downstream rms. The rst situation corresponds to ownership unbundling
between upstream and downstream parts of the market. As for the other two
cases, we equate legal unbundling with the following two assumptions. First,
each downstream rm maximizes its own prot, without taking into account any
impact on the upstream rms prot. Second, the upstream rm is not allowed
to discriminate between downstream rms by charging di¤erent access charges for
the use of its network. On the other hand, we assume that the upstream rm
chooses its network size in order to maximize its total prot, including the prot
of its downstream subsidiaries.
Our main results are as follows. Because the investment in the network is not
protected, at the time at which it is made, by a contract, the upstream rm will
not take into account the interests of its clients when choosing its size. This e¤ect
can be mitigated by allowing it to own part of the downstream industry. In other
words, ownership separation is more detrimental to welfare than legal unbundling.
We also obtain that these results are robust to the introduction of asymmetry in
network needs across downstream rms, imperfect downstream competition and
downstream investments.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of legal unbundling vs ownership unbundling on
the incentives of a network operator to invest and maintain its assets. We con-
sider an industry where the upstream rm invests in and maintains a network,
while several downstream rms compete in selling goods and services that use
this network as a necessary input (i.e., no bypass technology is available, at least
at an economically relevant price). Many network industries t this description
(telecommunications, railways, electricity, etc.) but we have in mind particularly
the natural gas industry.
There are many papers in the regulation, industrial economics and economics
of organizations literature that study the impact of various ownership structures in
network industries. The simplest such structure is one in which an upstream rm
(rm U) provides an input to a downstream rm (rm D). These papers often
compare the behavior of a vertically integrated rm with the equilibrium situation
where the upstream and downstream activities are undertaken by separate rms
(i.e., rms whose ownership di¤er from one another).
There are two types of considerations that might induce rm D and U to
merge. First, they might want to use the combined weight of the two rms for
strategic purposes. For instance, when the upstream rm has market power in the
supply of the input, but the downstream rm faces competition, the merger can
be a way to prevent a form of trickling upe¤ect of competition. We will call this
view the antitrust perspective, as it is the fear of this type of consequences that
prompts competition authorities to disallow some mergers. Second, there might
be some e¢ ciency gains to running the two rms as a single unit, and the aim of
the merger is to take advantage of these e¢ ciency gains. This type of merger can
arise in a competitive market, whereas the rst type could not. To stress the fact
that authors who write on this topic are interested in the internal functioning of
the rm, we will label this branch of the literature the managerial perspective
In this paper, we will be considering a situation where rm U is regulated, and
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where several downstream rms compete with each other. Regulatory practice has
typically analyzed the ownership of a downstream rm by the upstream rm in the
antitrust perspective and with suspicion: this ownership is seen as an open door
to anticompetitive discrimination; we think that it is fair to say that regulators
have often accepted vertical integration as a political compromise. The aim of
this paper is to begin exploring what the managerial perspective can bring to the
debate.
>From the managerial perspective, this paper mainly draws on the insights
linked to the notions of incomplete contracts and specic capital. In many cir-
cumstances, upstream and downstream rms must make investments in order to
improve the benets they derive from their relationships. For instance, they need
to conduct some research and development. This investment is specic if it is
productive exclusively within the context of this relationship.1 Because of the
incompleteness of contracts, the two rms, if they are not integrated, will choose
suboptimal levels of investment. Vertical integration will incite them to take into
account the interests of their partner, and will therefore mitigate the resulting
ine¢ ciency.2
What the managerial perspective calls vertical disintegration corresponds to
the ownership unbundling scenario that we study in the current paper. On the
other hand, the intermediate situation of legal unbundling has, to the best of our
knowledge, not been studied previously in the literature. By legal unbundling,
we mean the situation where the upstream and one or many downstream rms
belong to the same owners and where these owners, although they are the residual
claimants over the nancial returns generated by the rmsassets (i.e., they keep
the rmss prots), do not have the full control rights over the rmsdecisions.
1There are degrees of specicity depending on the usefulness of the investment outside of the
relationship with the other rm. For simplicity, we assume that the investment is only useful in
the framework of the relationship that we are considering.
2The notion of incomplete contract is introduced in the economic literature by Simon (1951).
Among the classical early references on vertical integration one can cite Klein, Crawford &
Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985) and Grossman & Hart (1986) (which is criticized by Riordan
(1990)). For accessible surveys see Crémer (1995) and Tirole (1995).
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More precisely, in our context legal unbundling between upstream and downstream
would mean that the upstream rm does not control its downstream subsidiaries
actions, such as their pricing or investment decisions. That this intermediate (be-
tween integration and full divestiture) situation has not been studied before is all
the more surprising that it is at the heart of most European directives on network
industries. For instance, the 2003/55 European Directive on natural gas states
In order to ensure e¢ cient and non-discriminatory network access it is appropri-
ate that the transmission and distribution systems are operated through legally
separate entities where vertically integrated undertakings exist. It is important
however to distinguish between such legal separation and ownership unbundling.
Legal separation implies neither a change of ownership of assets [. . . ]. However, a
non-discriminatory decision-making process should be ensured through organiza-
tional measures regarding the independence of the decision-makers responsible.
The way we model legal unbundling is as follows. We consider a sequential
game where the upstream rm rst chooses the size of its network, and where
two downstream rms then compete by selling goods that use this network as an
essential input. We contrast the (socially) optimal allocation with several equi-
librium situations, depending on the ownership structure in the industry. More
precisely, we consider the market equilibria when the upstream rm owns zero,
one or two downstream rms. The rst situation corresponds to ownership un-
bundling between upstream and downstream parts of the market. As for the other
two cases, we equate legal unbundling with the following two assumptions. First,
each downstream rm maximizes its own prot, without taking into account any
impact on the upstream rms prot. Second, the upstream rm is not allowed
to discriminate between downstream rms by charging di¤erent access charges for
the use of its network. On the other hand, we assume that the upstream rm
chooses its network size in order to maximize its total prot, including the prot
of its downstream subsidiaries. In other words, the regulator is unable to prevent
the network operator from choosing the dimension of its network that maximizes
the total prot of its owner.
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We show that the same concerns as those raised by the managerial perspective
on vertical integration are at play here. Because the investment in the network
is not protected by a contract at the time it is made, the upstream rm will not
take into account the interests of its clients when choosing its size. This e¤ect can
be mitigated by allowing it to own part of the downstream industry. In order to
show this, we present four di¤erent models. After introducing our general frame-
work in section 2, in section 3 we explore the strategies of the rms when the two
downstream rms face the same cost functions, use the network with the same
intensity and are price takers on the market for the nal output (on which they
sell their production). Section 4 revisits the same model assuming that the rms
have the same non-networkcost function, but have di¤erent network utilization
requirements. In section 5, we relax the assumption that the downstream market
is competitive. Section 6 assumes that the downstream rms can make some in-
vestments that reduce their use of the network at given output. In all these cases,
we obtain the same results: disallowing joint ownership of network and down-
stream facilities reduces the investment in the network. The conclusion, section 7,
discusses the limits of our work and the extensions that would be necessary for a
more complete comparison of legal and ownership unbundling.
2 The model
Consider an industry where one rm (referred to as upstream, indexed by U) is
in charge of building and maintaining a network, while two rms (downstream,
indexed by i = 1; 2) sell goods or services that use the network. One promi-
nent example of such an industry is the natural gas sector, where the upstream
rm builds the pipeline network while the downstream rms sell natural gas to
households and industrial customers. In order to bring gas to their customers,
downstream rms need to transport this gas from the place where it is injected
into the upstream rms network to the consumption node.
The upstream rm chooses the size l of the network it builds and maintains.
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The (constant) per-unit cost of the network is denoted by k, so that its total cost
is K = kl. Downstream rm i sells xi units of its product at price pi. Production
technology is such that each unit of good i uses one unit of network: there is no
bypass technology available at an economically relevant cost, so that the network
is an essential facility. In addition to network costs, rm i incurs downstream
costs of Ci(xi). In the natural gas sector, these downstream costs are the costs of
buying the gas and all other costs not related to transport, such as the distribution
or marketing costs. We assume that the downstream technology shows decreasing
returns to scale, so that C 0i(xi) > 0 and C
00
i (xi) > 0 .
3 To ensure concavity of
the prot functions, we will also often assume that C 000i (x) is positive. As for
the network costs, downstream rms pay to the upstream rm a constant access
charge a (that is endogenous in our model) for each unit of the network that they
use.
The products sold by both downstream rms are perfect substitutes.4 This
appears to be a sensible assumption in the natural gas market, since natural gas
is a homogenous product.5 Let X denote the total quantity in the downstream
market, so that X = x1 + x2. We denote by X(p) the aggregate demand for the
downstream product, and by p(X) the aggregate inverse demand. We assume
that the revenue functions pX(p) and Xp(X) are concave.
We model the following sequential game: rst, the upstream rm chooses the
size of the network and then the downstream rms choose their price. This timing
is natural given the nature of the decisions involved. We solve this game for various
scenarios concerning the downstream competitive conditions and the symmetry
between downstream rms. In Sections 3 and 4, we assume that the downstream
3This assumption is crucial in the rst part of the paper, since it guarantees that competitive
downstream rms earn a positive prot. However, it is not important for our argument per se.
To show this, the assumption is relaxed in section 5 where we introduce imperfect downstream
competition.
4This assumption is not crucial: our results would carry through if the downstream goods
were sold on totally separate, unrelated markets or if they were imperfect substitutes.
5However, note that the services that are sold together with the gas molecules can be di¤er-
entiated, for instance by adding interruptibility clauses. We abstract from these considerations
for the time being.
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rms are perfectly competitive (price takers). Consequently, they choose their
output level to equate marginal cost and market price. Section 3 is concerned
with the case where both downstream rms are symmetrical: they share the same
downstream cost function and have the same needs in terms of network usage.
Section 4 considers the case where the network is more adapted to one of the
downstream rms than to the other, while the non network related cost functions
of the two downstream rms are the same. This allows us to have a rst go
at understanding the impact of the ability for the upstream rm to discriminate
between downstream rms. Section 5 then studies the situation where downstream
rms have market power and play a Cournot game. Finally, section 6 analyzes
the impact of allowing downstream rms to make investments that would allow
them to decrease their need of network usage for any given output level.
We proceed similarly in Sections 3 to 6. We rst study the surplus-maximizing
allocation. We then solve for the downstream equilibrium, to obtain prices and
quantities as a function of the network size. We then study successively the
equilibrium allocation when the upstream rm owns both downstream rms, when
it owns none of them and when it owns one but not the other. As mentioned above,
we impose legal unbundling for the two cases where the upstream rm owns at
least one downstream rm. Our objective is to assess how legal and ownership
unbundling a¤ect the equilibrium network size.
3 Symmetric Equilibria
>From this point on, we assume that both downstream rms have the same (non
network related) cost function Ci and drop the subscript i. We begin by studying
the outputs that would be chosen by a welfare maximizing planner before turning
to the analysis of the game between the rms.
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3.1 Social Optimum
The social optimum is the allocation that maximizes total surplus S in the econ-
omy. Assuming quasi-linear preferences for consumers of the downstream prod-
ucts, total surplus is equal to consumers gross surplus minus upstream and down-
stream costs. The social planner chooses a network size l that solves
max
l
S =
Z l
0
p(s)ds  2C

l
2

  kl:
Denote the optimal level of variables by a . The solution is given by x1 = x

2 =
X=2 where X = l is dened by
p(X) = C 0

X
2

+ k = C 0(xi ) + k:
This condition is easy to interpret; it requires marginal cost to equal marginal
willingness to pay for the nal good. The marginal cost is equal to the sum of
marginal upstream and downstream costs. Further, observe that, at the optimum,
the marginal cost is the same for both rms.6 The optimal network size equals
the volume of goods sold at this optimal price.
3.2 Equilibrium in the downstream market
In the remainder of this section, we shall study di¤erent ownership structures. For
all of them, once the size of the network has been chosen, the downstream rms
act as price-takers; in this subsection, we study the prices which will prevail given
a choice of a network size l.
Because the downstream rms are price-takers, they consider both the market
price p of their output and the network access a to as given. Consequently, they
choose their output in order to equalize their marginal cost with the market price
p:
p = C 0(xi) + a: (1)
6This will hold true also when we introduce an asymmetry between the downstream rms.
In other words, productive e¢ ciency is necessary for social optimality.
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Their total production will be X(p), which is equal to their total demand for the
services of the network since equilibrium on the network input market requires
X(p) = l: (2)
Given a size l chosen for the network in the rst stage of the game, equations (1)
and (2) simultaneously determine the access charge a and the downstream price
p (and therefore also the quantity sold X) as functions of l; we denote these
functions by ~a(l) and7 ~p(l) = p(l): they denote the prices that will prevail as a
function of the choice of l.
We now turn to the equilibrium when the upstream rm owns both down-
stream rms.
3.3 Equilibrium when U owns both downstream rms
If U owns both downstream rms, it chooses l so as to maximize the sum of its
prots,
U = ea(l)l   kl;
and those of the two downstream rms, 1 and 2, where
i = xi (ep(l)) [ep(l)  ea(l)]  C xi(ep(l))
2

; i = 1; 2:
This sum is equal to
U + 1 + 2 = ea(l)l   kl +X (ep(l)) [ep(l)  ea(l)]  2C X(ep(l))
2

;
where ~a(l) and ~p(l) are the solutions to equations (1) and (2).
Observe that rm U has some market power, since it anticipates the equilib-
rium downstream prices (access charge a and nal price p) induced by its choice
of l. Further, the assumption that C 00(x) > 0 means that downstream rms make
a positive prot even when they act as price takers.
7Notice the di¤erence: p(l) represents the price at which consumers will choose to consume l
units of the nal good whereas ~p(l) represents the price which will prevail if l units of network
services are provided. In the model of this section, they are equal; with other technology of
productions they need not be.
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This scenario of legal unbundling di¤ers from the classical vertical integra-
tion case because the upstream rm U does not control the pricing policy of the
two downstream rms. In other words, the managers of the downstream rms
maximize their prot given the market price.
We reorganize this optimization problem to obtain
max
l;a;p
U + 1 + 2 = al   kl +X(p) (p  a)  2C

X(p)
2

;
s. t. p = C 0

X(p)
2

+ a;
X(p) = l:
Simplifying and using the inverse demand function yield
U + 1 + 2 = lp (l)  2C

l
2

  kl: (3)
Maximizing this expression with respect to l gives the following rst-order condi-
tion:
p+ lp0 = C 0

l
2

+ k: (4)
Equation (4) is the same condition that we would obtain if we assumed that the
three rms acted as an integrated prot maximizing monopolist and maximized
p(l)l   2C(l=2)   kl. Total marginal cost is the sum of the downstream mar-
ginal cost C 0 and of the upstream marginal cost k, rather than the access charge
paid by the downstream rm: when setting its network size, the upstream rm
understands that the access charge is a pure transfer between its subsidiary and
itself.
Using the superscript e2 to index the equilibrium levels of the di¤erent vari-
ables, we obtain
le2 < l and pe2 > p:
In words, the equilibrium network size is lower than optimal while the equilibrium
retail price is larger than optimal. Intuitively, the upstream rm chooses a lower-
than-optimal network size in order to reduce the downstream output level and to
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increase downstream prots. This result holds even with legal unbundling between
downstream and upstream rms i.e., even when managers of the downstream rms
do not take into account the prots of the upstream rm when they set their
prot-maximizing prices.
We now turn to the situation where downstream and upstream ownerships are
separated.
3.4 Equilibrium with ownership unbundling
When the upstream rm owns neither of the downstream rms, it sets the network
size in order to maximize its own prots,
U = ~a(l)l   kl:
Using equations (1) and (2) together with the symmetry between the downstream
rms, this optimization program can be rewritten as
max
l;a;p
U = al   kl
s.t. p = C 0

X(p)
2

+ a;
X(p) = l:
The two constraints imply
a = p(l)  C 0

l
2

which we substitute in U to obtain
U =

p (l)  C 0

l
2

l   kl; (5)
=

lp (l)  2C

l
2

  kl

  2

C 0

l
2

l
2
  C

l
2

: (6)
Observe that the rst term in the right hand side of (6) corresponds to U +
1 + 2 as dened in (3). Because the two downstream rms are price takers,
their downstream prices reect their marginal costs: per unit of output, they each
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charge C 0(l=2) to their customers to reect their costs. The second bracketed term
represents the di¤erence between the resulting revenue and their true cost. These
are prots that the network must abandon to the downstream rms.
From (6), we obtain
dU
dl

l=le2
=   l
e2
2
C 00

le2
2

< 0:
Denote by e0 the equilibrium levels of variables in the ownership unbundling
scenario. If the function U is concave, which it will be if the revenue function is
concave and if C 000  0,8 this implies
le0 < le2 < l:
In words, the fact that the upstream rm does not share in the downstream
prots induces it to further decrease l and X, compared to the legal unbundling
situation. Ownership unbundling is thus more detrimental to welfare than legal
unbundling in our setting. The intuition for this result is as follows. With owner-
ship unbundling, the upstream rms only source of prot is the selling of access to
its network. Total revenue of the upstream rm is given by 2axi = 2(pxi   xiC 0);
with xi = l=2. This is lower than downstream prot, which equals 2(pxi   C);
because decreasing returns to scale imply that xiC 0 > C. The gap between up-
stream revenue and downstream prot increases with the di¤erence between xiC 0
and C, which is itself increasing9 with xi and l. This explains why the upstream
rm has an incentive to further decrease its networks size when it does not own
any downstream rm.
We now look at the intermediate situation where the upstream rm owns
only one of the two downstream rms. We continue to assume legal unbundling
8Let R(x) = p(x)x be the revenue function. From (5), the second derivative of U with
respect to l is
R00(l)  C 00

l
2

  1
2
C 000

l
2

:
It is negative if R is concave and both C 00 and C 000 are positive.
9The derivative of xiC 0(xi)   C(xi) with respect to xi is xiC 00(xi), which is positive by
convexity of C.
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between the upstream and the downstream rm it owns.
3.5 Equilibrium when the upstream rm owns one of the
downstream rms
To study the situation where the upstream rm owns only one downstream rm,
one can proceed as in the previous section to obtain that
U + i =

lp (l)  2C

l
2

  kl

 

C 0

l
2

l
2
  C

l
2

; i = 1; 2: (7)
Di¤erentiating this equation, and denoting equilibrium levels by the superscript
e1, one shows10
le0 < le1 < le2 < l:
Another way to proceed will prove easier and more general. Note that the
objective function of U in this section, given by (7) is a convex combination of
the objectives in the previous two sections, which are given by (3) and (6):
U + i =
1
2
(U + 1 + 2) +
1
2
U ; i = 1; 2:
This in turn gives the same ranking of equilibrium and optimal network sizes,
provided that the objective functions are concave.
In words, incentives for the proper determination of the network size increase
with the number of downstream rms that the upstream rm owns. The intu-
ition for this result is as explained at the end of the previous subsection: because
of decreasing returns to scale, the di¤erence between the access revenues of the
upstream rm and the downstream prot increases with output. If the upstream
rm does not share in this downstream prot, it is induced to under-invest in its
network. As the upstream rm acquires more downstream rms, its incentives
to invest in the network increase, and the equilibrium network size increases to-
ward the optimal level. Observe that we have assumed throughout the analysis
10This requires to prove that the relevant objective functions, (U , U +i and U +i+j)
are concave. This is a straightforward consequence of the concavity of the revenue function, and
of the convexity of C and xC 0 (whose second derivative is 2C 00 + C 000).
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that legal unbundling prevails in the absence of ownership unbundling. We have
also obtained that, with legal unbundling, the equilibrium network size when the
upstream rm owns both downstream rms falls short of the optimal network size.
4 Downstream rmsasymmetry and discrimi-
nation
Let us now introduce some asymmetry between downstream rms, in the form
of di¤erent needs in terms of network access. We assume that the investments
made in the network by the upstream rm benet more one rm than the other.
In the natural gas sector, this situation could arise because of the localization of
the investments (new pipelines built in a region where one downstream rm has a
larger share of its customersportfolio than the other rm) or their type (investing
in LNG rather than pipelines for instance). The objective in this section is to
understand how the existence of discrimination a¤ects the optimal and equilibrium
size of the network, and how it relates with legal and ownership unbundling.
We model asymmetry in network needs as follows. We assume that down-
stream rm 1 benets more than downstream rm 2 from investments in the
network: rm 1 needs only (1 ) unit of network for each unit of nal good that
it sells. On the other hand, downstream rm 2 needs one unit of network use for
each unit of nal good sold, as previously. The parameter  2 [0; 1[ measures the
intensity of the additional benet that rm 1 gets from the network. We assume
that this parameter  is set exogenously (given by the technology, for instance).
An extension to our analysis would be to endogenize the setting of this parameter
by letting the upstream rm choose its prot-maximizing level.
Except for the introduction of the parameter , we maintain all the assump-
tions made in the previous section. We proceed as in the previous section by
looking rst at the optimal allocation before turning to the equilibrium alloca-
tions in the various unbundling scenarios.
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4.1 Social Optimum
The social planners optimization program is
max
x1;x2
S =
Z x1+x2
0
p(s)ds  C(x1)  C(x2)  k[(1  )x1 + x2];
yielding the following rst-order conditions
p(x1 + x2) = C
0(x1) + (1  )k;
p(x1 + x2) = C
0(x2) + k:
These are the usual conditions that price should equal marginal costs. Together,
they imply that
C 0(x1) + (1  )k = C 0(x2) + k;
i.e., that we have productive e¢ ciency at the optimum.
The rst order conditions allow us to obtain the optimal downstream quantities
and network size, which we denote as previously with a : x1; x

2 and l
 = (1  
)x1 + x

2:
4.2 Equilibrium in the downstream market
As in section 3, we need to compute the equilibrium of the game played by the
downstream rms as a function of l.
Competition in the downstream market generates the following equilibrium
conditions, which replace (1) and (2:
p = C 0(x1) + a(1  ); (8)
p = C 0(x2) + a; (9)
l = (1  )x1 + x2; (10)
X(p) = x1 + x2: (11)
The solution to these four simultaneously equations, yields the equilibrium levels
of the access charge, retail price and downstream quantities as functions of the
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network size and the parameter . Given that  is treated as exogenous in this
section, we denote these relationships by ea(l); ex1(l); ex2(l) and
ep(l) = p(ex1(l) + ex2(l)): (12)
Observe that unlike in the earlier section we now have that ep(l) 6= p(l) since
l 6= x1 + x2:
We now look at the equilibrium where the upstream rm owns the two down-
stream rms, with legal unbundling between the upstream and downstream seg-
ments.
4.3 Equilibrium when U owns the two downstream rms
We start by using the equilibrium quantities and price in the downstream markets
in order to obtain the prot levels of the three operators as a function of the
network size:
U = ea(l)l   kl;
1 = ex1(l) [ep(l)  (1  )ea(l)]  C (ex1(l)) ;
2 = ex2(l) [ep(l)  ea(l)]  C (ex2(l)) :
The objective of the upstream rm is to nd the network size l that maximizes
the sum of the three operatorsprots:
max
l
U + 1 + 2 = [ex1(l) + ex2(l)]ep(l)  C (ex1(l))  C (ex2(l))  kl: (13)
The rst order solution of this program is given by
ep(l)[ex01(l) + ex02(l)] + [ex1(l) + ex2(l)]ep0(l)
  C 0 (ex1(l)) ex01(l)  C 0 (ex2(l)) ex02(l)  k = 0: (14)
To simplify this expression, we use (12) and
ep0(l) = [ex01(l) + ex02(l)]p0(ex1(l) + ex2(l)); (15)
(1  )ex01(l) + ex02(l) = 1; (16)
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where (15) and (16) are obtained by di¤erentiating, respectively, (12) and (10).
We substitute equations (12) to (16) in (14). Using the superscript e2 to
denote the equilibrium levels of the variables in this scenario, we obtain after
simplications that
p(xe21 + x
e2
2 ) + (x
e2
1 + x
e2
2 )p
0(xe21 + x
e2
2 ) = C
0(xe21 ) + (1  )k
= C 0(xe22 ) + k;
i.e., the same conditions as if x1 and x2 were directly controlled by the upstream
operator. Marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost for both downstream opera-
tors. Observe that productive e¢ ciency is maintained by the combined rm, since
marginal costs are the same at equilibrium for the two downstream operators.
Comparing these prot-maximizing downstream quantities with their optimal
levels, we obtain that xe21 < x

1 and x
e2
2 < x

2; which implies that l
e2 = (1 )xe21 +
xe22 < l
 = (1   )x1 + x2: This is the same ranking of downstream quantities
and network sizes as in the symmetric case. Although the mechanism is made
more complex by the existence of asymmetric network needs between downstream
operators, the intuition for the result is not a¤ected by this asymmetry: the
upstream rm under-invests in the network, anticipating that lower downstream
quantities will generate larger prots for the two downstream rms that it owns.
4.4 Equilibrium with ownership unbundling
One could proceed as in the symmetric situation in order to solve for equilib-
rium quantities when ownership is unbundled between upstream and downstream
segments. It will prove easier to use the indirect method introduced in 3.5.
The upstream rm maximizes its own prot, which can be expressed as
U = (U + 1 + 2)  (1 + 2): (17)
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We can also rewrite the prot functions of the two downstream rms as
1 = ex1(l) [ep(l)  (1  )ea(l)]  C (ex1(l)) ;
= ex1(l)C 0 (ex1(l))  C (ex1(l)) ;
2 = ex2(l) [ep(l)  ea(l)]  C (ex2(l)) ;
= ex2(l)C 0 (ex2(l))  C (ex2(l)) :
Di¤erentiating prots with respect to network size, we then obtain
01 = ex1(l)C 00 (ex1(l)) ex01(l) > 0;
02 = ex2(l)C 00 (ex2(l)) ex02(l) > 0:
Using equation (17), we show
0U(l
e2) =

0U(l
e2) + 01(l
e2) + 02(l
e2)
  01(le2) + 02(le2) ;
= 0  01(le2) + 02(le2) < 0;
which by concavity of the function U implies
le0 < le2:
This shows that the intuition obtained in section 3.4 carries over to the case of
asymmetric downstream cost functions: with ownership unbundling, the upstream
rm fails to take into account downstream prots, with the di¤erence between
upstream and downstream prot levels increasing with downstream volumes. The
upstream rm has then an incentive to invest less in its network than in the case
where it owns the two downstream rms.
4.5 Equilibrium when the upstream rm owns one of the
downstream rms
We distinguish between the case where the upstream rm owns the downstream
rm 1 (denoted by e11) and the case where U owns rm 2 (denoted by e12). In
the e11 scenario, the objective of the upstream operator is to maximize
U = (U + 1 + 2)  2; (18)
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which allows us to use the same argument as in the e0 scenario where ownership
is totally unbundled between the upstream and downstream segments. More pre-
cisely, we evaluate 0U(l
e0) and 0U(l
e2); with U given by equation (18), to show
that (provided that U is concave in l)
le0 < le11 < le2:
Similarly, one can show that
le0 < le12 < le2:
The general conclusion that we draw from this section is that the relative
ranking of the equilibrium network sizes is robust to the introduction of asymmetry
between downstream rms. With such an asymmetry, ownership unbundling leads
to more under-investment than legal unbundling: the more integrated the industry
is, the closer the equilibrium network size comes to its optimal level.
We now study the robustness of our results to the introduction of imperfect
competition in the downstream market.
5 Imperfect competition in the downstream
market
In this section, we assume that both downstream rms compete à la Cournot on
the nal market. We maintain the assumption that the products they o¤er are
perfect substitutes. We retain the assumption that they are totally symmetric:
they have the same cost function and require the same use of the network. We
further assume that the downstream cost function is linear, with Ci(xi) = cxi.
Finally, we assume that the downstream rms act as price takers in their purchase
of network services.
5.1 Social Optimum
The social planners objective is to
max
l
S =
Z l
0
p(s)ds  cl   kl:
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The solution X = l to this problem is dened by
p(X) = c+ k:
This is the usual condition that marginal willingness to pay should equal marginal
cost. Since the (constant) marginal cost is the same for both downstream rms,
the socially optimal allocation is concerned with the total downstream quantities
and not with the individual quantities sold by each rm.
5.2 Equilibrium in the downstream market
With Cournot competition, each downstream rm chooses its output level xi in
order to maximize
i = xip(xi + xj)  axi   cxi;
= xi [p(xi + xj)  a  c] ;
given the output level xj supplied by its competitor j. The fact that rm i acts
as a price taker in the market for network services implies that it takes the access
charge a as given, and independent of its own demand for these services.
The rst order condition for downstream prot maximization is
xi =
p(xi + xj)  a  c
 p0(xi + xj) : (19)
Equation (19) together with the condition X(p) = l determine as previously the
access charge and retail price as a function of network size. These relationships
are denoted by ~a(l) et ~p(l) = p(l):
The symmetry between the two rms, together with the equilibrium condi-
tion on the market for input l imply that both rms choose the same output at
equilibrium
x1 = x2 = l=2:
This relationship allows us to simplify equation (19) to obtain
~p(l) = a+ c  l
2
~p0(l);
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with ~p0(l) < 0:
The intuition for this result is that each rm sells its product at a price larger
than its marginal cost a + c, with the mark-up being inversely proportional to
(half) the demand-price elasticity of output.
We now proceed to study equilibrium network size under various integration
scenarios.
5.3 Equilibrium when U owns both downstream rms
In its choice of network size, the upstream rm internalizes the downstream prot
and solves
max
l;a;p
U + 1 + 2 = al   kl +X(p) [p  a  c]
s.t. p = a+ c  l
2
~p0(l);
X(p) = l:
After simplication and using the inverse demand function, we obtain
U + 1 + 2 = l(~p(l)  c  k); (20)
whose maximization with respect to l gives the condition
~p+ l~p0 = c+ k: (21)
This condition is the usual prot-maximization solution of a monopoly, equalizing
marginal revenue and marginal cost.
Observe that the second order condition for total (downstream plus upstream)
prot maximization is given by
2~p0 + l~p00 < 0: (22)
We will use this result later.
As in the previous two sections, we obtain le2 < l and pe2 > p. The intuition
for this result is also the same as previously: the upstream rm under-invests in
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the network in order to decrease downstream quantities and increase downstream
prices. The main di¤erence with the previous section lies in the fact the down-
stream rms make a prot because of imperfect competition, not because returns
to scale are decreasing.
5.4 Equilibrium with ownership unbundling
If ownership is separated between upstream and downstream segments of the
markets, the upstream rm chooses the network size that maximizes
U = ~a(l)l   kl:
We can rewrite the optimization problem as
max
l;a;p
U = al   kl
s.t. p = a+ c  l
2
p0(l);
X(p) = l:
We obtain after substitution that
U = [p (l)  c  k] l + l
2
2
p0(l): (23)
The rst term in the right hand side of (23) is equal to the total prot U+1+2
as specied by equation (20) when the upstream rm owns both downstream rms.
This implies
dU
dl

l=le2
= le2

p0(le2) +
le2
2
p00
 
le2

< 0;
where the inequality is a consequence of condition (22). Therefore, by concavity
of U ,
le0 < le2 < l:
Although this ranking of network sizes is the same than under downstream
perfect competition coupled with decreasing returns to scale, the intuition di¤ers.
Note rst that the upstream rm revenue is given by axi = (pxi  cxi+ l2p0(l)=4)
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(with xi = l=2), which is lower than the downstream prot (equal to pxi   cxi)
because of the mark-up posted downstream. Moreover, the second order condition
for (total) prot maximization guarantees that the di¤erence between the two in-
creases with xi and l. In other words, the reason why the di¤erence between down-
stream prot and upstream revenue increases with the network size varies with the
downstream cost structure and competitive situation: under perfect competition,
it is due to the (assumed) convexity of costs while under imperfect competition,
it is due to the increase in the downstream mark-up.
5.5 Equilibrium when the upstream rm owns one of the
downstream rms
If the upstream rm owns one of the downstream rms, one can replicate the
argument mentioned in section 3.5: the constraints faced are the same in the
cases where the upstream rm owns zero, one and two downstream rms, while
the objective in the case e1 is a convex combination of the objectives in the
scenarios e0 and e2:
U + i =
1
2
(U + 1 + 2) +
1
2
U ; i = 1; 2:
We then obtain that, provided that the prot functions are concave in l,
le0 < le1 < le2 < l:
We then conclude from this section that the ranking of network sizes according
to the number of downstream rms owned by the upstream rm is robust to the
introduction of imperfect competition in the downstream market.
6 Investments by the downstream rms
We now study the robustness of our results to the introduction of a second decision
by the downstream rms, beyond the setting of their prices. This decision is how
much to invest in an activity that, although costly by itself, allows the downstream
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rm to economize on its network usage for any given level of output. The kind
of downstream investment we have in mind for the natural gas market consists in
o¤ering to nal clients interruptible contracts or alternatively buying insurance
to cover risks such as transport congestion due to a peak demand. These two
types of contracts are obviously costly for the downstream rm (in the rst case
because they decrease its output price, in the second because of the direct outlays
they represent) but allow it to decrease its needs in terms of network usage for
any level of output sold to clients.
We maintain the assumption of legal unbundling throughout the analysis, so
that the upstream rm cannot control the investment decisions of its downstream
subsidiaries. We model this extension to downstream investments as follows. The
prot of downstream rm i is given by
i = pxi   C(xi)  (yi)axi   yixi;
where, as above, the non network cost function C is convex, with C 000 > 0.
6.1 Social Optimum
The social planner chooses the network size l and the downstream investment that
solve the problem
max
l;y
S =
Z X
0
p(s)ds  2C

l
2(y)

  yl
(y)
  kl;
with X = l=(y):
Denoting the optimal level of variables by a  as previously, the rst order
condition with respect to network size is
p = p(X) = C 0

X
2

+ y + k(y) (24)
i.e., marginal willingness to pay should equal social marginal cost. With constant
marginal costs, the social optimum determines total downstream output but not
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how much is produced by rm 1 or rm 2. For later use, we express condition (24)
in terms of mark-up over the marginal non network cost:
p   C 0

X
2

= y + k(y) (25)
The rst-order condition with respect to downstream investment is
0(y)k =  1: (26)
Both rms should invest the same per-unit of output amount, which equalizes
marginal benet and marginal cost per unit of output.
6.2 Equilibrium in the downstream market
The two downstream rms, which are price takers both on the downstream market
and on the market for the network input, simultaneously choose their prot-
maximizing levels of investment, yi. Using the symmetry between downstream
rms, the rst-order condition for y is
0(y)a =  1; (27)
which is very intuitive, since it calls for equalization of the monetary marginal
benet from the investment with its marginal cost.
The price taking behavior of downstream rms implies
p = C 0

X(p)
2

+ a(y) + y; (28)
i.e., that the equilibrium price equals total marginal cost for the downstream rms.
Equilibrium on the input l market implies
(y)X(p) = l: (29)
Equations (27) to (29) simultaneously determine the access charge a, the down-
stream price p and the amount of downstream investment y (and thus also X) as
function of l. We denote these functions by ~a(l); ~y(l) and ~p(l): Observe that, as
in section 4, ~p(l) 6= p(l) because l 6= X = x1 + x2:
We now turn to the equilibrium when the upstream rm owns the two down-
stream rms.
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6.3 Equilibrium when U owns both downstream rms
When the upstream rm owns the two downstream rms, it maximizes the sum
of its prot, U and of prots of the two downstream rms, 1 and 2:
U + 1 + 2 =ea(l)l   kl +X (ep(l)) [ep(l)   (~y(l))ea(l)]
  2C

X(ep(l))
2

  ~y(l)X (~p(l)) ;
where ~a(l); ~y(l) and ~p(l) are the solutions to equations(27) to (29).
We reorganize this optimization problem to obtain
max
l;a;p;y
U + 1 + 2 = al   kl +X(p) (p  (y)a)  2C

X(p)
2

  yX(p)
s. t. p = C 0

X(p)
2

+ a(y) + y;
l = (y)X(p);
1 =  0(y)a:
After simplication, and using the inverse demand function, we obtain
U + 1 + 2 =
l
(y)
~p (l)  2C

l
2(y)

  kl   yl
(y)
whose maximization with respect to l gives the following rst order condition
~p(l) + l~p0(l) = C 0

l
2(y)

+ y + k(y); (30)
where y is determined by
0(y)a =  1:
This corresponds to the prot-maximizing condition of a monopoly, where mar-
ginal revenue equals total marginal cost. In order to compare with the socially
optimal price, we denote as usual the equilibrium levels with the e2 superscript
and reformulate (30) into
pe2   C 0

le2
2(ye2)

= ye2 + k(ye2)  le2~p0(le2): (31)
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We now compare the right hand sides of (25) and (31) term by term. The
sum of the rst two terms is the (per unit of output) network cost, including
the investment cost. Note that y + k(y) < ye2 + k(ye2) if a 6= k, since y
precisely minimizes y + k(y). This calls for a prot maximizing price pe2 larger
than its optimal level, because in the e2 scenario the downstream rms base their
investment decision on the access charge rather than the marginal social cost k,
and end up (when a 6= k) with a social marginal cost that is larger than its
socially optimal level. The third term in (31) pushes pe2 in the same direction
since it represents the classical impact of a prot-maximizing rm concentrating
on marginal revenue rather than considering that its nal price is exogenously set.
We then conclude that the mark-up over the non network cost is larger when the
upstream rm owns the downstream rms than its socially optimal level.
In section 3, the observation that the mark-up over non network marginal cost
C 0 was larger in the e2 scenario than its optimal level was enough to deduct that
pe2 > p and l > le2. This is not su¢ cient in the framework of this section, since
such comparisons also depend on the comparison between ye2 and the socially op-
timal downstream investment level y. This comparison in turn hinges on whether
the access charge a is larger or smaller than the network marginal cost k. Ob-
serve that, with legal unbundling, the upstream rm cannot control the pricing
decisions of its downstream subsidiaries. In the absence of downstream invest-
ment, the upstream rm induces a positive mark-up on the downstream market
by decreasing the size of its network and at the same time increasing the (market
clearing) access charge a, so that a > k. Introducing downstream investment, we
obtain that a further e¤ect of increasing a above k is to induce the downstream
rm to invest more than would be socially optimal: y < ye2. This in turn implies
that the downstream rm is able to sell more output for a given network size l
than with the optimal downstream investment level, which counteracts the e¤ect
of a higher access charge a on p.
We have not been able to obtain analytically unambiguous results with respect
to the comparison between optimal and e2 levels of a, y, l andX. We surmise that
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the new e¤ect mentioned above mitigates only partially the direct e¤ects described
in section 3, so that the most likely situation is the one where ae2 > k, y < ye2,
l > le2; pe2 > p and X > Xe2  i.e., where the relationships between prices and
quantities obtained in section 3 carry through to the case where downstream rms
make an investment. We show in section 6.6 that it is the case for the numerical
example we develop there.
6.4 Equilibrium with ownership unbundling
We proceed as in section 4.4, noting that the objective of the upstream rm is to
maximize its own prot, which can be expressed as
U = (U + 1 + 2)  (1 + 2):
We can also rewrite the prot functions of the two downstream rms as
i = exi(l) [ep(l)   (~y(l))ea(l)  ~y(l)]  C (exi(l)) ;
= exi(l)C 0 (exi(l))  C (ex1(l)) ;
where exi(l) = l
2 (~y(l))
:
Di¤erentiating prots with respect to network size, we obtain
0i = ex1(l)C 00 (ex1(l)) ex01(l);
where ex0i(l) = 2 (~y(l))  2l0 (y) ~y0(l)
42 (~y(l))
is of an ambiguous sign since 0 (y) < 0 and ~y0(l) < 0:
Observe that, if ex0i(l) > 0, then we can use the same reasoning as in section 4.4
to obtain, provided that the objective function U is concave,
le0 < le2:
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In that case, we would also have
le0 < le1 < le2:
Finally, it is easy to see that ye0 > y because, with ownership unbundling,
the only way for the upstream rm to make a prot is to charge an access price
larger than its marginal cost, a > k.
6.5 Equilibrium when the upstream rm owns one of the
downstream rms
We can proceed as in sections 3.5 and 5.5, to show that the objective in the case
e1 is a convex combination of the objectives in the scenarios e0 and e2, with the
same constraints in all three cases. Provided that the objective is concave, we
then obtain that the e1 levels of the variables p, y, and l should be in between
their equilibrium levels in scenarios e0 and e2.
6.6 A numerical example
The new e¤ects generated by the introduction of downstream investments have
prevented use from reaching unambiguous analytical conclusions when comparing
equilibrium and optimal levels of prices, network size and output. We therefore
present a numerical example where the comparison of the equilibrium levels in the
various scenarios is the same as in the previous sections.
We use the following functional forms
C(x) = x2;
(y) = 1 
p
y
10
;
X(p) = 100  5p:
We rst study the case where y is set exogenously equal to zero i.e., the case
developed in section 3. This allows us to show graphically the equilibrium and
optimal levels of the network size l and of output price p as a function of the
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marginal network cost k. Figure 1 shows that le0 < le1 < le2 < l while gure 2
illustrates that pe0 > pe1 > pe2 > p:
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here]
We now turn to the case where y is chosen by the downstream rms. In Table
1, we compare the optimum and equilibrium values of y, X, p, l and a when k is
set equal to 5.11
Table 1: Equilibrium levels when k = 5.
Scenarios
 e2 e1 e0
y 0.062 0.126 0.283 0.409
X 12.552 10.853 8.037 6.345
p 17.490 17.830 18.393 18.731
l 12.238 10.467 7.609 5.939
a 7.103 10.639 12.796
Table 1 shows that we obtain the following relationship: k < ae2 < ae1 <
ae0: Intuitively, as the number of downstream rms owned by the upstream rm
decreases, the upstream rm relies more and more on the access charge to increase
its prot. At the limit, with ownership unbundling (case e0), the access charge
is the only way for the upstream rm to obtain revenues. In all scenarios, the
equilibrium access charge is larger than its optimal level. It follows directly from
this that we obtain y < ye2 < ye1 < ye0 i.e., the equilibrium level of downstream
investment is too large and increases with ownership separation. The intuition is
that downstream rms react to large access charges by over-investing in activities
whose objective is to limit their network usage.
Table 1 also shows that l > le2 > le1 > le0 i.e., the main result of the
paper carries through to the case of downstream investments: the more ownership
is unbundled, the larger is the incentive for the upstream rm to decrease its
network size in order to raise its prot. We also obtain p < pe2 < pe1 < pe0 :
11We obtain the same qualitative results for any value of k between 0 and 20.
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prices increase with ownership unbundling. Finally, observe that, even though
downstream investment increases with ownership unbundling, total downstream
quantity decreases with ownership unbundling: X > Xe2 > Xe1 > Xe0: In
words, the main e¤ect at work when ownership is unbundled is the incentive for
the upstream rm to decrease its network size. The impact on the downstream
investment mitigates only partially the consequences of a smaller network size, so
that total quantity sold decreases with ownership unbundling.
7 Conclusion
In all the models that we have developed in this paper, we nd that full control of
the downstream industry by the upstream rm would be socially e¢ cient. This is
of course too strong a conclusion, but we still believe that our analysis highlights
important considerations for economic analysis. In this conclusion, we would like
both to discuss these lessons and explain how we believe our model should be
expanded and/or modied.
In all our models, we assume that the regulator has a strong control over the
behavior in the downstream market. In particular, it can completely prevent the
network from favoring one of the downstream rms and, in the models of sections 3
and 4 it can impose on the downstream rms that they behave competitively. On
the other hand, it has less control over the long term decisions of the network, in
our case new investment. We believe that this is a fair, if caricatural, character-
ization of the powers of most regulators. Our model stresses the fact that under
these circumstances making the upstream rm internalize the prots of its client
can be a powerful method for inducing it to invest more. Even if the upstream
rm owns only one of the two downstream rms, both rms benet from this
vertical integration.
To analyze in more details the tradeo¤s involved, we would need to modify the
model so that there is positive reasons why competition in the downstream market
is benecial. This would involve introducing explicitly some degree of asymmetric
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information, while preserving our emphasis on incomplete contracts and specic
investment, and will be the topic for future research.
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Figure 1 : Network size l as a function of network cost k
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Figure 2 : Output price p as a function of network cost k
5 10 15 20
k
17.5
18
18.5
19
19.5
20
p
Untitled-1 1
